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Coherence and Coreference Revisited
Andrew Kehler, Laura Kertz, Hannah Rohde, and Jeffrey L. Elman
University of California, San Diego
Abstract. For more than three decades, research into the psycholinguistics of pro-
noun interpretation has argued that hearers use various interpretation ‘preferences’
or ‘strategies’ that are associated with specific linguistic properties of antecedent
expressions. This focus is a departure from the type of approach outlined in Hobbs
(1979), who argues that the mechanisms supporting pronoun interpretation are
driven predominantly by semantics, world knowledge, and inference, with particular
attention to how these are used to establish the coherence of a discourse. On the
basis of three new experimental studies, we evaluate a coherence-driven analysis with
respect to four previously-proposed interpretation biases – based on grammatical
role parallelism, thematic roles, implicit causality, and subjecthood – and argue that
the coherence-driven analysis can explain the underlying source of the biases and
predict in what contexts evidence for each will surface. The results further suggest
that pronoun interpretation is incrementally influenced by probabilistic expectations
that hearers have regarding what coherence relations are likely to ensue, together
with their expectations about what entities will be mentioned next, which, crucially,
are conditioned on those coherence relations.
1. Introduction
More than three decades of research has sought to uncover the princi-
ples that determine how hearers interpret pronouns in context.1 This
work, which has predominantly been carried out in the psycholinguis-
tics and computational linguistics communities, has focused to a large
extent on identifying preferences or heuristics that hearers utilize to
interpret a pronoun; these preferences are often based on linguistic
properties of possible antecedent expressions, such as the grammatical
and thematic roles that they fill within a sentence. As a collection, these
preferences are often in conflict, and no clear consensus has emerged
with respect to how they are utilized nor how conflicts among them are
reconciled during the interpretation process.
The emphasis on such factors may partially explain Beaver’s (2004)
observation of a “curious near absence of work within [the formal
semantics and pragmatics] tradition on anaphora resolution”, particu-
larly with respect to its concentration on absolute semantic constraints
rather than semantically-relevant factors that cause some interpreta-
tions to be favored over others. Indeed, pronouns provide a textbook
1 Throughout the discussion, we will use pronouns to mean unaccented, third-
person pronouns, unless otherwise specified. Accented third-person pronouns are
considered in Section 3.5.
c© 2007 To appear in Journal of Semantics.
2 Kehler et al.
case of an underspecified linguistic form that must be semantically
interpreted within a context, and as such, we would argue, the study
of their behavior offers a window into the larger questions concerning
the semantic and discourse interpretation processes that go on around
them. Yet, with limited exceptions, the semanticist will find a striking
lack of emphasis on meaning in the existing literature on the topic.
The current focus on preference-driven theories is in fact a departure
from the type of approach outlined in Hobbs (1979), who, working in
the artificial intelligence tradition, argued that the mechanisms that
drive pronoun interpretation are driven predominantly by semantics,
world knowledge, and inference, with particular reference to how these
are used to establish the coherence of discourses. That is, in his account
the same types of inference processes that semanticists commonly ap-
peal to for computing implicatures, accommodating presuppositions,
and the like are also those used for computing, using his term, the
‘petty implicatures’ associated with assigning pronouns to their refer-
ents. Hobbs’s approach thus gives us a starting point for an attempt
to bridge the gap between semantics and psycholinguistic research as
they pertain to pronoun interpretation. In previous work Kehler (2002)
argued that the preferences commonly cited in the psycholinguistic and
computational linguistics literatures are to some extent epiphenomena
of the methods by which discourse coherence is established, although
he offered no new empirical data to support this position.
In this paper, we present new evidence in support of a coherence
analysis (sketched in Section 2), and describe how it can accommodate
a range of previous findings suggestive of conflicting preferences and
biases.2 We start in Section 3 by examining the grammatical subject
preference (Crawley et al., 1990, inter alia), which favors referents that
occupy the grammatical subject position of the previous clause, and
the grammatical role parallelism preference (Sheldon, 1974; Smyth,
1994; Chambers and Smyth, 1998, inter alia),3 which favors referents
that occupy the same grammatical role as the pronoun. We present the
results of our first experiment that show that both preferences can be
neutralized when coherence is carefully controlled for, and furthermore
argue that the grammatical role parallelism preference is an epiphe-
nomenon of an independent interaction between information structure
and accent placement in a particular class of coherence relations. We
2 To be clear, we will not ultimately conclude that coherence establishment is
the root cause of all biases in pronoun interpretation. See Section 7 for further
discussion.
3 Smyth does not characterize parallelism effects as the result of an independent
preference, but instead as a by-product of the structure of the coreference processor.
We discuss his analysis in more detail in Sections 3.1 and 3.4.
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follow in Section 4 with the results of a second experiment designed
to distinguish two types of bias proposed by Stevenson et al. (1994):
a thematic role preference, according to which the occupants of the
Goal thematic role are preferred to those that occupy the Source, and
an event-structure bias, according to which hearers focus on the end
state of the previous eventuality when interpreting an utterance. The
results support the event-structure bias, and further show that the
bias is limited primarily to those coherence relations which implicate
event structure in their formulation. In Section 5 we address the ram-
ifications of our analysis for the time course of pronoun interpretation
during incremental processing, and offer a model that captures how a
hearer’s coherence-driven expectations about how the discourse is likely
to proceed can predict on-line measurements of pronoun interpretation
difficulty. In Section 6 we examine a case study with respect to implicit
causality biases that have been well-studied in the psycholinguistics
literature, and argue on the basis of a third experiment that they
represent one instance of a more comprehensive set of biases that
drive predictive discourse interpretation. In Section 7 we revisit the
grammatical subject preference and offer reasons against interpreting
Crawley et al.’s (1990) results as support for an independent subject
assignment strategy. We also argue, however, that data from Steven-
son et al. (1994) offers more convincing support for the existence of a
subject bias beyond what can be explained solely by coherence-driven
expectations, and suggest a way in which this data can still be explained
without appeal to overlaid interpretation heuristics or preferences. We
conclude in Section 8 by summarizing the ways in which our analysis
provides alternative explanations of previous results and suggests areas
for future work.
2. Coherence and Coreference
Hobbs (1979) presents what in some respects could be considered to
be the most parsimonious theory offered to date of how pronouns are
interpreted. In his account, pronoun interpretation is not even an in-
dependent process, but instead results as a by-product of more general
reasoning about the most likely interpretation of an utterance, includ-
ing the establishment of discourse coherence. Pronouns are modeled
as free variables in logical representations which become bound during
these inference processes; potential referents of pronouns are therefore
those which result in valid proofs of coherence.
To illustrate, consider passages (1a) and (1b), adapted from an
example from Winograd (1972).
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(1) The city council denied the demonstrators a permit because...
a. ...they feared violence.
b. ...they advocated violence.
Hearers appear to have little difficulty resolving the pronoun they in
each case, despite the fact that it refers to the city council in sen-
tence (1a) and the demonstrators in sentence (1b). Note that the only
difference is the verb used in the second clause, which suggests that
semantics and world knowledge are responsible for determining the
correct referents. The Explanation coherence relation, as signalled by
because, is operative in each case (the variables S1 and S2 represent the
first and second sentences being related, respectively):
Explanation: Infer P from the assertion of S1 and Q from the
assertion of S2, where normally Q→ P .
Oversimplifying a bit, we encode the world knowledge necessary to
establish Explanation for (1) within a single axiom, given in (2).
(2) fear(X,V ) ∧ advocate(Y, V ) ∧ enable to cause(Z, Y, V )
→ deny(X,Y, Z)
If we assume that the variables X, Y , V , and Z are bound to the
city council, the demonstrators, violence, and the permit respectively,
axiom (2) says that if the city council fears violence, the demonstrators
advocate violence, and a permit would enable the demonstrators to
bring about violence, then it might “plausibly follow” that the city
council would deny the demonstrators a permit.
The first sentence in (1) is represented as in (3).
(3) deny(city council, demonstrators, permit)
This representation matches the consequent of axiom (2), triggering
a process of abductive inference that can be used to establish Ex-
planation. At this point, X will become bound to city council, Y to
demonstrators, and Z to permit.
Both of the follow-ons (1a-b) provide information that can be used to
establish one of the conjuncts in the antecedent of the axiom, thereby
establishing a causal connection between the clauses. Clause (1a) is
represented as in (4), in which the unbound variable T represents the
pronoun they.
(4) fear(T, violence)
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This predication unifies with the first conjunct in the antecedent of
axiom (2), forcing the unification of the variables T and X. Since X
is already bound to city council, the variable T representing they also
receives this binding, and the pronoun is therefore resolved.
Likewise, clause (1b) is represented in (5).
(5) advocate(T, violence)
This predication also matches a conjunct in the antecedent of axiom (2),
but in this case it is the second conjunct, which will necessitate the
unification of the variables T and Y . Since Y is already bound to
demonstrators, the representation of they also receives this binding.
Thus, identification of the correct referent for the pronoun in both (1a)
and (1b) is a by-product of establishing an Explanation relation.
Despite the appeal of this example, the literature has largely rejected
Hobbs’s approach in favor of methods that rely on more surface-level as-
pects of linguistic representation, such as the grammatical and thematic
roles that potential antecedents occupy. There are no doubt reasons
for this; for one, there are statistical tendencies in support of such
preferences (e.g., a bias toward references to the previous subject as
compared to other grammatical positions) that do not receive obvi-
ous explanations from a purely coherence-driven theory. Further, it is
unclear how facts concerning incremental processing can be predicted
by a coherence-driven account that relies on information that may not
become available until well after the pronoun is encountered.4
Kehler (2002) extended Hobbs’s work by presenting a typology of
coherence relations, most taken or adapted from those in Hobbs (1990),
based on three general classes of “connection among ideas” first artic-
ulated by Hume in his Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding –
namely Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause or Effect
(Hume 1955:32 [1748]). Kehler argues that these categories differ in the
types of inference processes used to establish them; this distinction in
turn affects how pronouns are interpreted. This, Kehler claims, explains
why different heuristic preferences appear to dominate in different con-
textual circumstances. We will describe exemplar relations in each of
the three categories (particularly Occasion, Parallel, and Result) as
well as the manner in which establishing each interacts with pronoun
interpretation by considering examples (6a-d):
(6) a. Bush narrowly defeated Kerry, and special interests promptly
began lobbying him. [=Bush]
4 Both of these concerns will be addressed later in the paper.
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b. Kerry was narrowly defeated by Bush, and special interests
promptly began lobbying him. [=Kerry]5
c. Bush narrowly defeated Kerry, and Romney absolutely trounced
him. [=Kerry]
d. Bush narrowly defeated Kerry, and he quickly demanded a
recount. [=Kerry]
The alternation found in examples (6a-b) can be used to argue for
the existence of a grammatical subject preference. The difference in
voice in the first clause results in different entities being realized in
subject position, and most informants find that the favored interpreta-
tion for the pronoun shifts accordingly. Kehler argues that the subject
preference is most closely associated with examples that participate in
the Contiguity relation Occasion (such as (6a-b)), which is defined as
follows (adapted from definitions in Hobbs (1990)):
Occasion: Infer a change of state for a system of entities from the
assertion of S2, establishing the initial state for this system from
the final state of the assertion of S1.
Occasion allows one to express a situation centered around a system of
entities by using intermediate states of affairs as points of connection
between partial descriptions of that situation. As such, the inference
process that underlies Occasion attempts to equate the initial state
of the second utterance with the final state of the first, performing
inferences as necessary. Biases in pronoun interpretation in Occasion
are therefore predicted to correspond to the relative degrees of salience
of the event participants with respect to (the hearer’s mental repre-
sentation of) the event’s end state. As the grammatical subject is the
canonical place to mention the topic of a sentence – in the sense that,
information-structurally, (6a) highlights what Bush did whereas (6b)
highlights what happened to Kerry – it stands to reason that the degree
of salience accorded to Bush and Kerry would differ between (6a-b),
and with it, the preferred referent for the pronoun.6
Thematic role biases discussed in the literature can also be linked to
Occasion. In a passage completion experiment, Stevenson et al. (1994)
found evidence for both a grammatical subject preference and a bias
in favor of entities that occupy the Goal thematic role over those that
occupy the Source. Whereas participants were considerably more likely
to complete passages like (7a) in a way that requires he to refer to John
5 The preference for Kerry in this case may rely to some degree on the hearer
knowing that he is a U.S. Senator, and thus, like Bush, is able to be lobbied.
6 Section 7 will present a refinement of this characterization.
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rather than Bill (here John is both the subject and the Goal), they are
equally likely to complete passages like (7b) in a way that requires that
he refer to Bill (a non-subject Goal) as John (a subject Source).
(7) a. John seized the comic from Bill. He
b. John passed the comic to Bill. He
Stevenson et al. thus conclude that there is both a subject assignment
strategy and a Goal preference at work – which agree on a referent in
(7a), but disagree in (7b) – and that the Goal preference may result
from a bias toward focusing on end states. We will return to this topic in
Section 4, where we argue that the end-state bias is in part a by-product
of the manner in which Occasion relations are established.
Example (6c) provides counterevidence to the subject preference we
witnessed in (6a-b) since the preferred referent is the object of the
first clause rather than the subject. Such examples have been used to
argue for a grammatical role parallelism preference, which favors enti-
ties that occupy the same grammatical role as the pronoun (Sheldon,
1974; Smyth, 1994; Chambers and Smyth, 1998, cf. fn 3). Kehler argues
that this preference is closely associated with Resemblance coherence
relations such as Parallel, in which commonalities and contrasts among
corresponding sets of parallel relations and entities are established:
Parallel: Infer P (a1, a2, ...) from the assertion of S1 and P (b1, b2, ...)
from the assertion of S2, for a common P and similar ai and bi.
In (6c), the entities Bush and Romney are parallel, as are Kerry and the
referent assigned to him. We will henceforth refer to such pairs ai and
bi for some i as parallel elements. Examples cited to support a gram-
matical role parallelism preference are often characterized by Parallel
relations, as are the typical stimuli found in psycholinguistic research in
support of the preference (Smyth, 1994; Chambers and Smyth, 1998).
The bias towards a pronoun’s parallel element in these constructions is
very strong; informants are almost unanimous in judging the pronoun
in (6c) to refer to Kerry (assuming that the pronoun is not contrastively
accented; more on this in Section 3.5). The question, then, is why the
same effect is not seen in example (6a). Note that this preference is
not straightforwardly predicted on a coherence-driven theory, since
assigning either referent in (6c) would result in a perfectly coherent
Parallel relation. Kehler (2002) offers a rationale for this association,
but that position will be revised in Section 3.5.
Finally, example (6d), repeated below as (8), is an instance of the Re-
sult relation, which, like the previously-discussed Explanation relation,
is in the Cause-Effect category.
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(8) Bush narrowly defeated Kerry, and he quickly demanded a recount.
[=Kerry]
Establishing a Cause-Effect relation requires that a causal link be iden-
tified between the propositions denoted by the utterances in a passage.
The Result relation is essentially the same as Explanation except the
cause precedes the effect:
Result: Infer P from the assertion of S1 and Q from the assertion of
S2, where normally P → Q.
The analysis of example (8) would follow the spirit of the analysis
of examples (1a-b). As this example violates both the subject and
grammatical parallelism preferences, it argues instead for a ‘common
sense’ preference, since the interpretation of the pronoun appears to be
determined by the same world knowledge that is used to establish the
coherence of the passage, specifically that one would expect the loser
of an election to demand a recount rather than the winner.
To sum, we have described three categories of coherence relation
that are associated with three underlying inference processes, which in
turn appear to be correlated with different types of pronoun interpre-
tation biases. In the sections that follow, we describe psycholinguistic
experiments intended to evaluate the evidence for these biases in the
context of a coherence-driven analysis.
3. Grammatical Role Preferences
The first of our studies addresses the conflict between the subject and
grammatical parallelism preferences in light of the coherence analysis.
Much of the motivation for the experiment and its design draw from
the work of Smyth (1994), and additional aspects are motivated by the
work of Wolf et al. (2004). We briefly describe these two works in turn,
and then follow with a discussion of our experiment.
3.1. Smyth (1994)
Smyth (1994) posits an Extended Feature Match Hypothesis (EFMH),
which characterizes pronoun assignment as a search process based on
feature matching that predicts that a “pronoun with two or more
grammatically and pragmatically possible antecedents in a preceding
clause will be interpreted as coreferential with the candidate that has
the same grammatical role” (p. 197). Whereas we have thus far cast
the parallelism preference as a heuristic, it is worth noting that Smyth
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explicitly denies this view, stating that “PF [=parallel function] is not
a special default strategy, but rather an epiphenomenon arising from
the structure of the coreference processor”, and thus “there is no sense
in which it is an independent rule or strategy to be acquired”. Instead,
coreference is established by a feature-match process, and due to a
priming effect, the identity of the grammatical role filled by the referent
is available as one of the criteria for matching, along with other features
(e.g. number, gender). A lack of full syntactic parallelism between the
clauses – such as when one clause contains an adjunct and the other
does not – is predicted to prevent syntactic priming and reactivation,
resulting in fewer parallel interpretations (pp. 206–207).
We will focus on the two of Smyth’s four experiments that are
central to our analysis, his Experiments 2 and 3.7 Both are argued
to provide evidence for the EFMH, and hence to contradict Craw-
ley et al’s (1990) claim that parallel function “is not important for
understanding pronouns in text”. The Experiment 2 materials were
constructed by taking twenty of Crawley et al.’s stimuli and modifying
them so that the clauses were fully parallel syntactically. The non-
subject roles were varied between direct, indirect, and prepositional
objects. A sample passage is given in (9).
(9) Mary helped Julie change the tire and then she helped Peter change
the oil.
Participants were asked to fill a blank by writing the name of the
person that they understood the pronoun to refer to. The results over-
whelmingly favored parallel assignment; 100% of the subject pronouns
were assigned to the preceding subject, and 88.12% of the nonsubject
pronouns were assigned to the nonsubject referent.
Experiment 3 tested the prediction that a reduction in the paral-
lelism between the clauses should reduce the number of parallel re-
sponses. It varied three factors: grammatical role parallelism for the
non-subjects (parallel vs. not parallel), full syntactic parallelism (no
adjunct vs. adjunct), and pronoun position (subject or nonsubject).
The results further supported parallel assignment, as the percentage
of parallel assignments ranged from 64% to 90% across conditions.
There were also main effects of adjunct parallelism and grammatical
role parallelism: Cases in the nonparallel adjunct condition received
fewer parallel assignments than those in the parallel condition, and
similarly cases in the nonparallel role condition received fewer parallel
assignments than those in the parallel condition.
7 The first experiment was a small study to test the role of context sentences in
Crawley et al.’s experiments on their results. The fourth tested a variety of effects
in cases involving subordinate structures, which will not concern us here.
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As pointed out by Kehler (2002), however, an examination of Smyth’s
syntactically parallel stimuli suggests that his modifications to Crawley
et al.’s examples may have introduced a confound, in that in some cases
they also changed the operative coherence relation from Occasion to
Parallel, whereas Occasion appears to be more highly represented in
his nonparallel stimuli. Hence, our first experiment controls for and
manipulates syntactic parallelism and coherence separately. So as to
keep the results as directly comparable as possible, our design will
otherwise follow Smyth’s fairly closely, particularly with respect to
being an off-line task in which readers are explicitly asked for their
pronoun assignments.
3.2. Wolf et al (2004)
Wolf et al. (2004) previously tested the predictions of Kehler (2002)
against both the grammatical subject and grammatical role parallelism
preferences in a reading time experiment that manipulated coherence
frame (Parallel/Result) and pronoun gender (masculine/feminine). Co-
herence was signaled by manipulating the verb in the context sentence
as well as a connective between the first two clauses, specifically and
similarly (which signals a Parallel relation) and and so (which signals a
Result relation). In half of the stimuli, the referent indicated by pronoun
gender supported the coherence frame, and in the remaining half it did
not. Examples are given in (10a-b).
(10) a. Fiona complimented Craig and similarly James congratulated
her/him after the match, but nobody took any notice.
b. Fiona defeated Craig and so James congratulated her/him after
the match, but nobody took any notice.
For the Parallel stimuli, faster reading times were measured when the
antecedent was in a parallel grammatical role than when it was not.
For the Result stimuli, which were semantically biased toward a non-
parallel referent, faster reading times were measured for non-parallel an-
tecedents. Wolf et al. thus confirmed that preferences for pronoun inter-
pretation can be reversed by manipulating coherence, per Kehler (2002).
Several questions remain that warrant investigation, however. First,
Wolf et al. used gender-unambiguous pronouns, which, in the causal
continuations, resulted in interpretations that were less coherent in
the parallel antecedent condition than in the non-parallel condition
(consider the variant of (10b) with the pronoun him versus her). As
a result, the increased reading times could have been caused by this
incoherence rather than by the pronoun interpretation process. Sec-
ond, Wolf et al.’s stimuli contained only object pronouns, and thus
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each possible interpretation was supported by either the grammatical
subject preference or the grammatical role parallelism preference. We
ask whether similar results would be found for subject pronouns with
object antecedents, which are dispreferred by both preferences. Third,
since their stimuli all include a prepositional phrase in the second
clause but not in the first, the passages did not have fully parallel
structure. Whereas this property is irrelevant to a general grammatical
role parallelism preference, it makes their results potentially compatible
with the EFMH’s prediction that a lack of full syntactic parallelism
will result in a reduced parallelism bias. Finally, it has been proposed
that connectives carry their own focusing properties (Stevenson et al.,
1994; Stevenson et al., 2000) that can affect antecedent selection, such
that the use of and similarly and and so in Wolf et al.’s data could
be claimed to redirect the current focus of attention in different ways.
While we find this idea to be uncompelling in several respects (see
footnote 25), we can test whether similar effects will be found for stimuli
without connectives by not relying on them to disambiguate coherence.
3.3. Experiment 1
The present experiment addresses a variety of factors by independently
varying sentence structure, pronoun position, and coherence relation
in an ambiguous pronoun resolution task (Kertz et al., 2006). Two
versions of each preference are evaluated – a ‘basic’ version, which
characterizes it as a single, all-purpose processing strategy, and a par-
ticular ‘modified’ version, which corresponds more closely to one of
the aforementioned proposals in the literature. The basic version of
the grammatical subject preference states an across-the-board prefer-
ence for antecedents that occupy the subject position of the previous
clause. The modified version allows for the possibility that the subject
preference will not override an interpretation favored by a strong prag-
matic bias (Crawley et al., 1990). The basic version of the grammatical
role parallelism preference states an across-the-board preference for
antecedents that occupy the same grammatical role as the pronoun.
The modified version adds an additional constraint requiring that the
syntactic structures of the two clauses be fully parallel; otherwise the
grammatical subject preference is invoked (Smyth, 1994).8
8 As Crawley et al. did for the grammatical subject preference, Smyth likewise
appeals to the idea that plausibility factors could limit the applicability of the
parallel grammatical role preference. We address this proviso in Section 3.4.
12 Kehler et al.
3.3.1. Stimuli
In a 2x2x2 design, stimulus sets were constructed with eight variants,
as in (11a-d). Each stimulus contains two clauses: an introduction and
a follow-on that contains an ambiguous pronoun. Both clauses contain
a transitive verb in active voice.
(11) Samuel threatened Justin with a knife, and
a. ...Erin blindfolded him (with a scarf). [Parallel]
b. ...Erin stopped him (with pepper spray). [Result]
c. ...he blindfolded Erin (with a scarf). [Parallel]
d. ...he alerted security (with a shout). [Result]
Sixteen stimulus sets were constructed for a total of 128 experimen-
tal stimuli. Each set varied pronoun position (subject/object), sen-
tence structure (fully/partially parallel), and coherence relation (Paral-
lel/Result). With possible antecedents as the subject and object of the
first clause, we are able to test the full 2x2 configurations of possible
coreference patterns.
As in Wolf et al. (2004), passages participating in Result relation-
ships semantically favored the non-parallel referent, whereas those par-
ticipating in Parallel relations incorporated no semantic bias. The mod-
ified grammatical subject preference can thus be evaluated by analyzing
the Parallel condition only. The distinction between full and partial
syntactic parallelism between the clauses was implemented by either in-
cluding or excluding a modifier phrase in the second clause to match the
modifier in the first clause, which were varied between pre-verbal ad-
verbial phrases and post-verbal prepositional phrases, balanced across
sets. Varying the stimuli across this dimension allows us to determine if
pronoun interpretation is affected by the existence of full versus partial
syntactic parallelism, as predicted by the modified grammatical role
parallelism preference, when coherence is controlled for separately.
Coherence type was assessed in a norming phase, during which
trained judges, blind to our hypothesis, were asked to categorize stimuli
as instances of either Parallel coherence or Result coherence. Three of
three judges agreed on the coherence relation for 119 out of 128 total
stimuli. For the remaining nine stimuli, two of three judges agreed with
an averaged confidence level above a pre-determined threshold.
3.3.2. Participants
Thirty-two undergraduates from the University of California, San Diego
participated for extra course credit. All were self-reported monolingual
speakers of English.
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3.3.3. Task
A repeated measure design was used, in which each participant was
tested on two stimuli from each of the eight types, with no two variants
from the same set presented to the same participant. The two repli-
cations were block randomized, and the sixteen experimental stimuli
were interleaved with twenty-four distractors (sixteen of which also
contained ambiguous pronouns, and eight of which contained unam-
biguous pronouns). The resulting sixteen lists were then reversed to
rule out ordering effects, yielding thirty-two unique stimulus lists.
Participants were presented with a paper and pencil task, for which
they read a two-clause passage and answered a question immediately
after, as in (12).
(12) Samuel threatened Justin with a knife, and he blindfolded Erin
with a scarf.
Who blindfolded Erin?
The participant’s answer was taken to indicate the antecedent selected
in interpreting the ambiguous pronoun.
3.3.4. Predictions
As we have characterized it, the ‘basic’ form of the grammatical subject
preference predicts a strong bias toward interpreting all pronouns to
refer to the subject of the previous clause. The modified form predicts
the same bias, but only in Parallel relations since the Result stimuli
were pragmatically biased. The ‘basic’ form of the grammatical role
parallelism preference predicts a strong bias toward interpreting subject
and object pronouns to refer to subject and object antecedents respec-
tively. The modified grammatical role parallelism preference makes the
same predictions, but only for the stimuli in the fully parallel con-
dition. The coherence hypothesis makes the same predictions as the
basic grammatical role parallelism preference for Parallel coherence
stimuli (regardless of the full/partial syntactic parallelism distinction),
but predicts an interpretation bias toward grammatically non-parallel
referents for Result stimuli.
3.3.5. Results
The results followed the predictions of the coherence hypothesis, con-
firming the expected interaction between pronoun position and coher-
ence type, but were not consistent with the other hypotheses. The
raw number of subject versus object assignments for each of the eight
conditions is shown in Table I.
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Table I. Results of Experiment 1 by Condition
Coherence Syntax Pron Position Subject Ante Object Ante
Parallel parallel subject 64 0
object 5 59
non-parallel subject 61 3
object 8 56
Result parallel subject 2 62
object 59 5
non-parallel subject 4 60
object 61 3
Table II organizes the results according to the predictions of each
account. These results show that the manipulations to test the basic
and modified forms of both the grammatical subject and grammatical
parallelism preferences all resulted in near 50/50 splits, whereas the
predictions of the coherence analysis were all confirmed with at least a
90/10 split.
The dependent measure for our statistical analyses was the rate of
assignments to the subject antecedent (subject and object assignments
received scores of 1 and 0 respectively). A full factorial analysis of
variance was conducted with pronoun position (subject/object), sen-
tence structure (fully/ partially parallel), and coherence relation (Paral-
lel/Result) as factors, with separate analyses treating participants (F1)
and items (F2) as random variables. The analysis confirms that the
interaction between coherence type and pronoun position, predicted by
the coherence hypothesis, is significant (F1(1,31) = 1379.23, p < .0001;
F2(1,15) = 2016.158, p < .0001). A second, smaller effect, which we did
not predict, was found for coherence alone (F1(1,31) = 4.429, p < .05;
F2(1,15) = 7.105, p < .05), where subject antecedents were selected
more often in Parallel coherence relations than in Result relations.
Collapsing across conditions, the overall mean score was .516+/-
.062. A one-sample t-test comparing this mean to a hypothetical mean
of .5 demonstrates that the overall rate of subject antecedent assign-
ment is not significantly different from chance, contra the grammatical
subject preference. Whereas the main effect of coherence described
above could potentially be interpreted as slight support for the modified
subject preference, this effect is overwhelmed by the effect predicted by
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the coherence analysis. The main effect of pronoun position, predicted
by the grammatical role parallelism preference, is not statistically sig-
nificant; nor is the interaction between sentence structure and pronoun
position predicted by the modified grammatical role parallelism pref-
erence. There was no significant effect of structure, and no significant
interaction between structure and coherence. Likewise, there was no
significant three-way interaction among coherence, syntactic structure,
and pronoun position. As such, lack of parallel structure did not impact
the likelihood of a parallel pronoun assignment in the Parallel condition,
for either subject or object pronouns. Finally, modifier type (pre-verbal
adverbial versus post-verbal prepositional phrase) was not a significant
factor alone or within any interaction.
These results support the coherence hypothesis, confirming that
pronoun interpretation preferences can be triggered or suppressed by
manipulating coherence relations. They also suggest that the contra-
dictory results reported in the literature to date may stem at least in
part from a failure to control for coherence in experimental stimuli.
We forgo a detailed discussion of these results with respect to the
grammatical subject preference until Section 7, since Experiments 2
and 3, to be presented subsequently, are relevant to that discussion
as well. We discuss these results with respect to the EFMH further
in the next section. We then follow up in Section 3.5 with a semantic
analysis that, we claim, demonstrates that the grammatical role paral-
lelism preference is an epiphenomenon of the interaction of information
structure and accent placement in Parallel relations.
3.4. Comparison with the EFMH
We conclude from the results of Experiment 1 that coherence is the
dominant factor in determining parallel reference assignments, and not
grammatical structure: (i) parallel structure did not give rise to parallel
coreference in Result stimuli, and (ii) reduced syntactic parallelism did
not reduce the likelihood of a parallel interpretation in Parallel stimuli.
As we have discussed, these results contrast with the predictions
of the EFMH, which characterizes pronoun interpretation as a feature
matching process that is sensitive in part on the degree of syntactic
parallelism between clauses. With respect to result (i) above, however,
it should be noted that Smyth acknowledges that pragmatic biases
might be at work in some examples: “in some cases, a conjunction can
introduce a pragmatic bias which is incompatible with a PF interpreta-
tion” (p. 208). He cites example (13), in which a causal interpretation
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Table II. Results of Experiment 1 by Analysis
Condition Subject Ante Object Ante N
The Subject Preference
all pronouns .52 .48 512
The Qualified Subject Preference
non-biasing context .54 .46 256
(Parallel coherence)
The Parallel Structure Preference
subject pronouns .51 .49 256
object pronouns .52 .48 256
The Qualified Parallel Structure Preference
subject pronouns .52 .48 128
(fully parallel structure)
object pronouns .50 .50 128
(fully parallel structure)
The Coherence Hypothesis
subject pronouns .98 0.02 128
(Parallel coherence)
subject pronouns 0.05 0.95 128
(Result coherence)
object pronouns 0.10 0.90 128
(Parallel coherence)
object pronouns 0.94 0.06 128
(Result coherence)
supports interpreting the nonsubject pronoun him as coreferent with
the subject Phil:
(13) Phil tickled Shanley, and (so) Liz poked him.
While it is not completely clear to us how such biases are predicted to
interact with the feature matching mechanism of the EFMH, example
(13) is of the sort employed in our stimuli for the Result condition.
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Following Sheldon (1974), however, Smyth also correctly notes that
the parallelism effect is so strong that it can seemingly trump gender
mismatches (see also Oehrle (1981)):
(14) William bumped Bonnie and ?she/SHE poked Rod.
That is, example (14) is infelicitous without accent on she (cf. 13), even
though there is only one female referent available.9 This fact weakens
the force of Smyth’s appeal to pragmatic biases with respect to exam-
ples like (13), however, since one is left with a parallelism effect that is
so strong that it can withstand a firm semantic constraint like a gender
mismatch but yet is soft enough to be overridden by a more pliable
pragmatic bias. And the fact of the matter is that pragmatic biases
cannot override parallel function if the operative coherence relation is
Parallel, as pointed out in Kehler (2002). Consider (15):
(15) Condi Rice admires Hillary Clinton, and George W. Bush abso-
lutely worships her.
Assuming a Parallel relation with a deaccented her, informants reliably
report that the referent must be Clinton, despite a strong pragmatic
bias toward Rice given the political persuasions of the politicians in-
volved. It therefore needs to be explained why plausibility can save a
nonparallel pronoun interpretation in (13) but not in (15). The crucial
difference between the acceptable (13) and the unacceptable version
of (14) is that (13) participates in a Result relation whereas (14) par-
ticipates in a Parallel relation. Plausibility only comes into play in
determining which referent makes for a coherent Result relation in (13).
3.5. A Semantic Analysis of the Grammatical Role
Parallelism Preference
Experiment 1 revealed a dramatic bias in Parallel (but not Result)
coherence relations toward a referent in a parallel grammatical role,
across both the subject pronoun and object pronoun conditions. In
this section, we ask why Parallel coherence is so strongly aligned with
parallel coreference, giving the appearance that a parallel grammatical
role bias is at play. We argue that the bias emerges from the interaction
between coherence relations and information structure, for reasons that
are independent of a theory of pronoun interpretation.
9 We will offer an explanation for this infelicity in the next section.
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3.5.1. Parallelism Effects
That there would be an association between Parallel coherence and par-
allel coreference may, at first blush, seem unsurprising on a coherence-
driven analysis. After all, when establishing Parallel coherence, the
inference mechanism attempts to establish points of similarity between
a pronoun and its parallel element. It stands to reason that the way to
establish maximal similarity is to assume coreference between the two.
Indeed, Kehler (2002) posited an analysis of just this sort.
This observation does not fully explain the behavior we discussed in
the previous section, however. For one, as we just saw, the parallelism
effect is recalcitrantly strong as compared to other types of preferences
noted in the literature, able to withstand strong pragmatic biases (15)
and even gender conflicts (16).
(16) Condi Rice admires Donald Rumsfeld, and George W. Bush abso-
lutely worships her. [=Rumsfeld?]
Yet the strength of the parallelism bias cannot be attributed only to the
semantics of the Parallel relation, since substituting a mention of either
referent by name in place of the pronoun in either of these examples
results in a perfectly coherent Parallel passage.
No other preference proposed in the literature is resilient to gram-
matical and world-knowledge influences in a similar way. Yet, as we
have already seen, the effect simply appears to go away when the op-
erative coherence relation is non-Resemblance. That is, the coreference
pattern that was infelicitous for (15) and (16) is perfectly acceptable
on a Result interpretation, per (17a-b) respectively.
(17) a. Condi Rice defeated Hillary Clinton and George Bush congrat-
ulated her.
b. Condi Rice defeated John Kerry and George Bush congratu-
lated her.
Lest there be any doubt that these different interpretation patterns
are due to the difference in coherence type, we can ask whether passages
that are ambiguous between Parallel and Result construals enforce dif-
ferent constraints on the interpretation of unaccented pronouns across
the two coherence construals. This is indeed the case; consider (18):
(18) Powell defied Cheney, and Bush punished him. (Kehler, 2002)
On the Parallel construal of (18) (paraphrase and as and similarly),
him can only refer to Cheney if unaccented (i.e., it can refer to Powell
only if it receives accent). On the other hand, on the Result con-
strual (paraphrase and as and as a result), him can refer to Powell
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if it is unaccented. All of these data show a clear pattern whereby
Resemblance relations (e.g., Parallel) require an unaccented pronoun to
corefer with its parallel element, whereby pronouns in non-Resemblance
(e.g., Result) relations are not similarly constrained.
In the remainder of this section, we argue that these facts are pre-
dictable from the manner in which different coherence relations par-
tition utterances information-structurally with respect to focus and
background, and how this partition in turn determines the placement
of accent on referring expressions (whether pronominal or not) within
an utterance. The analysis explains the data that has been used to
support a grammatical role parallelism preference without appeal to
any pronoun-specific interpretation mechanisms or strategies.
3.5.2. Coherence, Coreference, and Accent
The idea that the aforementioned facts are unrelated to pronominal-
ization goes against the common wisdom in the literature, which of-
ten treats accented pronouns in English as being governed by spe-
cial rules or associated with specific discourse functions. For example,
Kameyama (1999) proposes a Complementary Preference Hypothesis,
which says that “a focused pronoun takes the complementary prefer-
ence of the unstressed counterpart”, that is to say, one first computes
the preferred referent for an unaccented pronoun, and then selects an
entity from the remainder of the ‘currently salient’ set of entities. Simi-
larly, Beaver (2004) offers an analysis in which Kameyama’s predictions
result from partial blocking effects between accented and unaccented
pronouns in a bidirectional-OT implementation of a Centering-based
pronoun interpretation system. Smyth (1994) likewise posits that ac-
cented pronouns selectively block the parallel interpretation when the
EFMH applies. Finally, Gundel et al. (1993), in their treatment of
referring expressions and cognitive status, place unaccented and ac-
cented pronouns into two different categories (in focus and activated
respectively; p. 283, fn. 14).
However, it turns out that all of the aforementioned facts concern-
ing coherence and accentuation are actually constraints on corefer-
ence rather than merely pronominalization (Akmajian and Jackendoff,
1970; Venditti et al., 2002; de Hoop, 2004). This can be seen by con-
sidering variants of our previous examples in which the pronouns are
replaced by proper name mentions of their referents. In all of these
cases, the requirements on accenting the direct object (marked using
capital letters) are insensitive to whether a full name or pronoun is
used:
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(cf. 18, on the Parallel reading
Likewise, the lack of accenting on the pronoun in the Result cases
remains when a proper name is used instead:


















(cf. 18, on the Result reading)
Therefore, the information structural constraint at work is one that
relates coherence and coreference to accentuation, and is not specific
to pronouns. Simply put, pronouns are not constrained to refer to
their parallel elements in Parallel relations. Instead, the information
structural constraints imposed by Parallel relations (but not Result
relations) require that the pronoun, like any other referring expression,
receive accent when it is not coreferential with its parallel element.
The factors that determine the ability to pronominalize a mention and
those that determine accentuation, while independent, interact to entail
that unaccented pronouns in Parallel relations can only corefer with
their parallel elements. As such, these data do not result from any
special-purpose functions of accented pronouns, nor can they be used
to support the existence of a grammatical role parallelism bias.
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3.5.3. An Analysis
The facts described so far call instead for an explanation for why
Parallel and Result relations differ information-structurally, such that
they impose different constraints on what elements of a sentence must
receive accent. Kehler (2005) outlines an analysis, cast using the ma-
chinery of Schwarzschild’s (1999) optimization-driven theory of focus
marking and accent placement, that accounts for these differences. We
only summarize the arguments here.10 The crucial fact is that Parallel
and Result relations will give rise to different F(ocus)-markings for
otherwise similar (or, in the case of ex. 18, identical) examples, which
in turn results in different distributions of accents. A brief discussion
of Schwarzschild’s system should suffice to understand the argument.
In Schwarzschild’s analysis, F-marking serves as the interface be-
tween semantics and phonology. On the semantics side, felicitous ut-
terances are entailed by the prior discourse (that is, Given), with the
proviso that F-marking a phrase effectively turns it into a ‘wildcard’
(or ‘F-variable’) when matching against an antecedent. For instance,
in a context that mentions a red apple, the NP a [green]F apple will be
considered Given. On the phonology side, there is a constraint that Foc-
marked nodes – F-marked nodes that are not immediately dominated
by another F-marked node – must contain an accent. As such, the word
green in a [green]F apple will require accent.11
In establishing Givenness, FOC-marked nodes are assigned discourse
antecedents by a function h; in the example just given, h will map the
denotation of green to that of red. In Schwarszchild’s system, an OT-
style optimization procedure solely determines h. Kehler (2005) argues
against this aspect of the analysis, claiming that it cannot predict
accent patterns for passages like example (18), repeated below as (24a),
in which accent varies depending on the coherence relation inferred.
(24) a. Powell defied Cheney, and Bush punished him.
b. BUSHF1 PUNISHEDF2 HIMF3 . (Parallel, HIM=Powell)
c. BUSHF1 [PUNISHEDF2 him]F3 . (Result, him=Powell)
Kehler claims that h assigns different mappings to the two coherence
construals. In particular, the mapping established for the Parallel rela-
tion is precisely the one that results from the identification of parallel
elements (i.e., the ai and bi). As such, if the pronoun him refers to
Powell in (24a), the Parallel relation (and hence h) will enforce the
10 Readers who are not interested in the technical details of the argument can skip
the remainder of this section without loss of continuity.
11 A variety of other rules and constraints are also at play, which we will not
discuss here.
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following mapping between entities and predicates in the second clause
(left side of the equations) and their parallel elements in the first clause
(right side of the equations):
(25) a. [[BushF1 ]]
g, h = [[Powell]]g
b. [[punishedF2 ]]
g, h = [[defied]]g
c. [[PowellF3 ]]
g, h = [[Cheney]]g
Loosely speaking, this F-marking results in the background Who did
what to whom. Because h applies only to F-marked constituents, him
must be F-marked for this mapping to hold, and by Foc must be ac-
cented despite it representing Given information, per (24b). On the
other hand, if him refers to Cheney in (24a), h need not map it to a
distinct entity as it would then be coreferential with its parallel element.
In this case, [[Cheney]]g, h = [[Cheney]]g, and Cheney becomes part of
the background (i.e., Who did what to Cheney).
Unlike the Parallel relation, however, F-marking in a Result rela-
tion is not governed by a pairwise mapping since its definition does
not incorporate one. Instead, the F-marking in (24c) is favored. In
this partition, unlike that in (24b), Powell is part of the background,
representing a shared variable in the causal relation used to establish
coherence (e.g., the P in defy(P,C)→ punish(B,P )). As such, it is not
F-marked, and thus need not receive accent.
The crucial fact to be abstracted from this brief synopsis is that
Parallel relations, by way of establishing a mapping between parallel
elements, give rise to a particular focus/background partition. A side-
effect of this partition is that a noun phrase (pronominal or not) that
does not corefer with its parallel element will require accent regardless
of its Givenness status in the remainder of the discourse. Result rela-
tions are not similarly restricted, and as such, the optimal focus/accent
distribution will often result in the deaccenting of a noun phrase that
denotes Given information without any parallelism restriction. Hence
we find different constraints at play in (24a) depending on the coher-
ence relation that is construed. This analysis likewise explains the full
set of interpretation patterns witnessed in (19–23), and in particular
demonstrates how the resistance of the apparent parallelism bias to
influences of semantic plausibility (19) and gender conflicts (20) results
without recourse to any pronoun-specific principles.12
12 The above analysis is restricted to cases in which a common relation over parallel
entities comprises the background (the “common topic”), which is the case in all
of the examples we have considered. Oehrle (1981) notes that in other “discourse
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To summarize this section, our experiments and analysis show how
a coherence-driven analysis predicts when evidence for the parallel
grammatical role preference will emerge – particularly, in Resemblance
relations like Parallel – and the underlying information-structural rea-
son why it does. As a result, there is no work left to be done by positing
a separate parallel grammatical role bias or heuristic.
4. Thematic Role Biases
A finding of Experiment 1 was that participants reliably interpret a
subject pronoun to refer to a non-subject referent in Result relations
if the semantics of the passage support that interpretation. This pos-
sibility is not limited to Result relations, however. As we indicated in
Section 2, Stevenson et al. (1994) report on a series of story completion
experiments that suggest that the occupants of some thematic roles are
systematically preferred to others. Of particular interest here are the
patterns they found for passages with a transfer-of-possession context
sentence followed by an ambiguous pronoun, as in (26):
(26) John handed a book to Bob. He
In such cases, the subject fills the Source role and the object of the
prepositional phrase fills the Goal role. Participants were asked to
provide a natural completion to the pronoun prompt provided in the
second sentence, and the pronoun was then categorized as referring to
frames” a pronoun can remain deaccented even when not coreferential with its
parallel element, as in (i):
(i) A: Can you give me an exact description of Bill’s role in the fight?
B: John hit Billb and heb hit Max.
The difference between this example and the others is that the context sets up Bill’s
participation as the background, as opposed to the question Who hit who?. Our
analysis predicts this accent pattern given that A’s question is the antecedent of
both clauses in B’s response, rather than the first clause of B’s response serving as
antecedent to the second.
Also, whereas we have focused on accented pronouns in Parallel relations since
those are the cases relevant to our argument, accented pronouns can of course occur
outside of Parallel relations. For the results of a corpus analysis see Wolters and
Beaver (2001), who conclude that most instances of accented pronouns in their data
can be seen as signaling rhetorical contrast, of which the examples discussed here
would presumably constitute one type. See also Kehler (2005) for a discussion of
examples that involve accented pronouns in Result relations – e.g., Johni pushed
Bill and HEi/JOHNi fell – in which accentuation is similarly orthogonal to the
form of referring expression used.
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the Source or the Goal. They found that Goal continuations, i.e. those
which correspond to a Goal interpretation for the pronoun, occurred
about as frequently as Source continuations (a 49%-51% split).
The result seems intuitive enough: In a passage such as (27), in
which the Occasion relation is operative, pronominal reference to Bob
appears to be unobjectionable:
(27) John handed a book to Bob. He began reading it.
Yet this is unexpected in light of the grammatical subject and gram-
matical role parallelism preferences, since both point to John as the
preferred referent. Whereas participants could have first assigned the
pronoun using these biases and then written a continuation that ac-
commodated that assignment, apparently this is not what happened.
Stevenson et al. describe two potential explanations for their result.
The first is a thematic-role bias which amounts to a heuristic that
ranks Goals above Sources. The second is a bias for focusing on the
end state of the previously described event, under the assumption that
the Goal is more salient to the end state than the Source. Stevenson
et al. ultimately argue for the end-state bias; under this interpretation,
the apparent heuristic preference for Goals is an epiphenomenon.
Our coherence analysis predicts an end-state bias, but only specif-
ically for passages related by Occasion. Recall that in our analysis,
the different biases underlying pronoun interpretation are ultimately
traceable to properties of the inference processes that are used to estab-
lish coherence. Among the coherence relations discussed in Section 2,
Occasion is the only one that specifically incorporates a bias toward
focusing on the end state of the previous eventuality:
Occasion: Infer a change of state for a system of entities from the
assertion of S2, establishing the initial state for this system from
the final state of the assertion of S1.
As such, the coherence analysis would predict that different pronoun
interpretation biases will emerge for different coherence relations, and
in particular, that Occasion relations will give rise to a Goal preference.
4.1. Experiment 2
An experiment was designed to distinguish Stevenson et al.’s two possi-
ble explanations, as well as test the predictions of the coherence analysis
(Rohde et al., 2006). Passages like (26) were paired with versions in
which the imperfective form of the main verb was used (28).
(28) John was handing a book to Bob. He
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Crucially, the thematic roles remain the same in examples (26) and
(28), but the perfective verb in (26) describes a completed event which
is compatible with end-state focus, whereas the imperfective verb in
(28) describes an event as an ongoing process, making it incompatible
with end-state focus (Moens and Steedman, 1988). The thematic role
preference thus predicts a similar distribution of Source and Goal in-
terpretations between the two conditions, whereas the event structure
hypothesis predicts a greater percentage of Source interpretations in
the imperfective condition than in the perfective condition. We focus
the present discussion on testing these predictions, and will return to
the predictions of the coherence analysis momentarily.
4.1.1. Stimuli
Twenty-one experimental stimuli consisted of a transfer-of-possession
context sentence followed by an ambiguous pronoun prompt, as in (26)
and (28). Participants saw either the perfective or imperfective form of
each verb, but not both. The Source referent always appeared in subject
position, and the Goal was always the object of a to-phrase. All verbs
described physical transfer events (e.g. hand, throw); we excluded verbs
that described abstract or conceptual transfer (e.g. show, teach).
We also included twenty-nine filler passages with non-transfer verbs
(transitive and intransitive) in the context sentence that varied be-
tween perfective or imperfective. The transitive verbs (Agent-Patient
and Experiencer-Stimulus) varied in active and passive voice. Adverbs,
proper names, or gender-unambiguous pronouns served as prompts.
4.1.2. Participants
Forty-eight monolingual English-speaking undergraduates at UC San
Diego participated in the study for extra credit in Linguistics courses.
4.1.3. Task
Our design followed Stevenson et al. closely. Participants were asked to
write continuations for the fifty passages. They were instructed to imag-
ine a natural continuation to the story, writing the first continuation
that came to mind and avoiding humor. As noted by Arnold (2001),
in this task participants create a mental model of the event described
by the context sentence before writing a continuation; as such, the
task involves both interpretation and production. While the prompt
constrains the surface realization of the subject to a pronoun, we hy-
pothesize that their continuation depends in part on their expectations
about how the discourse will proceed and which individual in the event
will be mentioned again.
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4.1.4. Evaluation and Analysis
Two trained judges assessed the participants’ intended pronoun inter-
pretations. Judges were instructed to be cautious, erring on the side of
categorizing a pronoun as ambiguous if the pronoun could be plausibly
interpreted as coreferential with either referent, even if their personal
interpretation biases strongly indicated a particular one. As such, not
all responses could be disambiguated.13
4.1.5. Results
The results, shown in Table III, indicate that pronoun interpretation is
sensitive to verbal aspect: Imperfective context sentences yielded sig-
nificantly more Source interpretations (70%) than perfective sentences
(51%; F1(1,47) = 52.854, p < 0.0001; F2(1,20) = 30.079, p < 0.0001).14
As such, the event structure hypothesis is supported over a thematic
role bias, since the latter predicts no difference in the distribution of
interpretations across conditions.





4.2. Effects of Coherence
These results suggest that the Goal bias is at least in part an epiphe-
nomenon of a bias toward focusing on the end state of the previous
eventuality. We now examine the main prediction of the coherence
analysis, specifically that the end-state bias will be primarily an epiphe-
nomenon of establishing Occasion relations. As for other coherence
relations, the predictions are as before: Resemblance relations (par-
ticularly Parallel) should favor a grammatically parallel antecedent,
and Cause-Effect relations (e.g., Explanation, Result) will depend on
the semantics incorporated in the passage and the referent to which
causality or consequentiality is most likely to be imputed in a particular
context.
13 Our use of judges follows Arnold (2001). Stevenson et al. (1994) had participants
circle their intended referents after completing the passages. However, they too
ultimately relied on judges to remedy contradictions in the participants’ circling.
14 Table III excludes cases that were judged to be ambiguous.
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To test this prediction, our judges annotated all unambiguous re-
sponses with the coherence relation that held between the context
sentence and the continuation. Judges resolved disagreements through
discussion, following Stevenson et al. (2000). Our analysis is restricted
to the perfective cases since only these are compatible with end-state
focus.15 Six coherence relations were annotated: Occasion, Explana-
tion, Result, Violated Expectation (another relation in the Cause-Effect
category), Parallel, and Elaboration (another relation in the Resem-
blance category), although Parallel, representing less than 2% of the
continuations, is not analyzed further.16
The results are shown in Table IV, which lists for each coherence
relation its overall frequency and the percentage of pronoun interpreta-
tions to the Source. We found that Occasion relations were dominated
by Goal continuations, whereas Elaborations and Explanations showed
a Source preference (Occasion: t(45) = 5.3537, p < 0.0001; Elabora-
tion: t(42) = -19.66, p < 0.0001; Explanation: t(30) = -6.4983, p <
0.0001 (one-sample t-tests)).17 The restriction of the Goal preference
to Occasion relations reinforces the conclusion that a generic thematic
role preference is insufficient as a predictor of pronoun interpretation.18
Whereas our results support Stevenson et al.’s conclusion that the
Goal preference is an epiphenomenon of a bias toward focusing on end
states, they further show that the end-state bias is to a large degree an
15 Analysis of the imperfective condition revealed a different distribution of co-
herence relations, but a highly similar relationship between each coherence relation
and the corresponding distribution of Source and Goal interpretations. The fact that
the different distributions in Figure III can be attributed to a different distribution
in coherence relations across the perfective and imperfective conditions provides
further support for the coherence analysis.
16 This analysis is similar to one conducted by Arnold (2001), who ran a passage
completion experiment in a no-pronoun, full-stop condition, allowing participants
to use either a pronoun or name to re-mention a referent at their discretion. Coding
a coarser three-way split between cause, endpoint, and other relations, she similarly
found differences in the biases across continuation type.
17 These t-tests use subject means. The results over item means are consistent
(Occasion: t(20) = 7.2642, p < 0.0001; Elaboration: t(19) = -69.7292, p < 0.0001;
Explanation: t(19) = -9.1115, p < 0.0001 (one-sample t-tests)).
18 We also found a Goal bias for Result relations, but the small set of Result
continuations (< 6%; n = 25) was very homogenous, more than half consisting of
the form X transfers Y to Z. Z thanks X, making extrapolation difficult. Whereas
our coherence analysis would predict that causal inference plays a greater role in
establishing Result relations than Occasion relations, the effect described by the
second eventuality in a Result sequence is often a direct result of the end state
brought about by the first, and thus it would perhaps not be surprising to find
an end-state bias for Result relations as well. This notwithstanding, Stewart et
al. (1998) show that verbs are highly variable with respect to their biases in Result
relations; see Section 6 for further discussion.
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Table IV. Probabilities from Experiment 2 (Perfectives)
Coherence Relation Percentage of Corpus Source Bias
Occasion (171) .38 .18
Elaboration (126) .28 .98
Explanation (82) .18 .80
Violated Expectation (38) .08 .76
Result (25) .06 .08
epiphenomenon of the inference processes used to establish Occasion
relations. The bias toward the Goal simply disappears when either
of the other two common relations (Elaboration or Explanation) is
operative. While the context sentences in all of our perfective stimuli
describe events with salient end states, the results summarized in Ta-
ble IV strongly suggest that it is the coherence relation that dictates the
extent to which that endpoint is relevant. Occasion relations exhibit a
clear preference for the Goal, as they are precisely the relations that rely
specifically on the end state of an eventuality in establishing coherence.
Thus, thematic role biases constitute another case in which a coherence-
driven analysis can explain the underlying reasons we see evidence for
an interpretation heuristic, as well as why this evidence emerges only
in particular contextual circumstances.
5. On-line Interpretation
Summing to this point, the previous two experiments have provided
support for a coherence-driven theory of pronoun interpretation. Exper-
iment 1 showed that the grammatical subject and parallel grammatical
role preferences can be neutralized when coherence has been carefully
controlled for in the stimuli. Experiment 2 supported Stevenson et al.’s
proposal that event-structure biases are involved in pronoun interpreta-
tion (rather than thematic role biases), and furthermore localized them
to those coherence relations that could be expected to encode such a
bias as a side effect. In each case we closely followed the design of the
antecedent work to which we compared ourselves, which meant using
off-line methods for assessing interpretations.
An obvious remaining question for a coherence-driven theory is what
it predicts about incremental processing. There is a wealth of on-line
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evidence that language interpretation proceeds in a highly incremental
fashion, and pronoun interpretation has been a rich source of such
evidence (Caramazza et al., 1977; Gordon and Scearce, 1995; Stewart
et al., 1998; Koornneef and van Berkum, 2006, inter alia). The question
is how coherence establishment can influence pronoun interpretation in
cases in which the pronoun is encountered before the coherence relation
is known. We begin addressing this question in this section, and then
continue in the sections that follow with respect to two case studies:
implicit causality effects and the grammatical subject preference.
Our proposal follows the lead of Arnold (2001), who hypothesized
that referent accessibility is influenced by a hearer’s probabilistic ex-
pectations about what referents will be subsequently mentioned in the
discourse, which are in part driven by expectations about how the
discourse is likely to be continued.19 We focus our analysis on the
role of coherence-driven expectations associated with discourse contexts
in terms of two types of probabilistic information that are naturally
combined: (i) expectations concerning how the discourse is likely to
be continued with respect to coherence relation, and (ii) the likelihood
that a certain referent will get mentioned by a pronoun conditioned on
the occurrence of that coherence relation. These come together in the
following equation (in which ante stands for an antecedent in a partic-
ular grammatical or thematic position, and CR stands for coherence
relation):20
(29) P (pronoun = ante) =
∑
CR∈CRs P (CR)∗P (pronoun = ante|CR)
For example, to compute the likelihood that a pronoun will corefer
with the subject of the previous sentence, we simply sum, over all
coherence relations, the likelihood of seeing that coherence relation
multiplied by the likelihood of a subject reference given that coherence
relation.21 This equation makes explicit the idea that at any point
19 It also follows recent work in sentence processing that contends that on-line
measurements of interpretation difficulty can be successfully predicted by proba-
bilistic, expectation-driven models (e.g., Hale 2001; Levy 2007). These models posit
that the sentence processor implicitly makes predictions about what words are likely
to come next in an utterance; degree of processing difficulty corresponds inversely
with how well these expectations align with the material that is actually seen. Hale
and Levy show that expectations can be estimated to good effect using generative
models trained from on-line corpora, and that they predict a variety of reading time
data that has been reported in the sentence processing literature.
20 All terms in (29) are of course conditioned on the current context as well.
21 This formula is no doubt too simplistic as a full theory of probabilistic pronoun
interpretation (one reason will be discussed in Section 7), however we can nonetheless
use it for current purposes to illustrate how our analysis can make predictions about
incremental processing.
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during comprehension the hearer will have expectations about how
the discourse will be continued with respect to coherence and that
the difficulty in interpreting the linguistic material to follow will be
conditioned in part on those expectations. These expectations will
then evolve based on subsequent linguistic input that influences the
probabilities represented.
Values for these terms need to be estimated in order to make pre-
dictions about on-line interpretation. However, we do not have direct
access to the relevant probability distributions that language processors
implicitly represent at a particular point in a discourse, nor is corpus
analysis feasible if one desires a tight control on contextual factors.
Instead, sentence completion tasks like that used in Experiment 2 have
become a standard way to estimate such biases (Caramazza et al., 1977;
McKoon et al., 1993; Stewart et al., 1998; Koornneef and van Berkum,
2006, inter alia). For the case of the perfective transfer-of-possession
sentences used in Experiment 2, therefore, the two columns of biases
shown in Table IV provide estimates of P (CR) and P (pronoun =
source|CR) respectively. When applied to equation (29), these numbers
result in an average 56.7% bias toward the Source at the time that a
subject pronoun is encountered.22
Following a substantial previous literature that demonstrates that
such biases impact reading times (see the review in the next section
on implicit causality), these numbers would predict at most a modest
reading time delay for Goal interpretations over Source ones. While the
overall results are similar to the near 50-50 split found by Stevenson
et al. (1994), our results show that there is nothing 50-50 about the
pattern once coherence is taken into account. Each of the coherence
relations encodes a considerably stronger bias one way or the other
about who will be mentioned next; it is only after the frequencies of
coherence continuation are factored in that the biases have a cancelling
effect.
Equation (29) further predicts that other phenomena which influ-
ence the likelihood of the upcoming coherence relation could impact
pronoun interpretation biases, and as such, influence reading times.
An obvious example is coherence-constraining connectives. Consider
the connective because, which is only consistent with the Explanation
relation. Because the occurrence of because after a Source-Goal passage
would essentially drive the probability of Explanation toward one and
the others toward zero, the probabilities in Table IV would predict an
22 The bias toward the Source was reported as 51% in Section 4.1.5, which
was the percentage in a Source/Goal/ambiguous distinction (see footnote 14). The
56.7% bias reported here represents normalized percentages after setting aside the
ambiguous cases.
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average 80% bias for a subject referent. In this case we would expect
proportionately longer reading times for pronouns that referred to the
Goal as compared to the Source.23
This expectation-driven view of incremental processing contrasts
with a common view in the literature, whereby surface-level features de-
termine the initial referent assigned to a pronoun, to be later confirmed
or contradicted by plausibility factors (e.g. Gordon and Scearce 1995,
inter alia). We believe our analysis provides a more parsimonious ac-
count that simultaneously captures documented preferences based on
surface cues and a range of phenomena that are problematic for them.
We elaborate in the sections that follow, considering first the phe-
nomenon known under the rubric of implicit causality.
6. Implicit Causality
Perhaps the most well-studied phenomenon relevant to the interaction
between coherence and pronoun interpretation involves so-called Im-
plicit Causality (IC) verbs. The literature on the topic is voluminous;
out of necessity our discussion will not be comprehensive (but see
Rudolph and Forsterling (1997) for a comprehensive review as of their
writing). Consider (30a-b), from Caramazza et al. (1977):
(30) a. Jane hit Mary because she had stolen a tennis racket.
b. Jane angered Mary because she had stolen a tennis racket.
Intuitively, the pronouns in (30a-b) refer to Mary and Jane respectively.
The reason for the difference points directly at the matrix verb, since
the passages are otherwise identical. Caramazza et al. (1977) conclude
that IC is a feature of verb roots that selects one entity as the “probable
instigator or causal source for a series of events”, which is in turn
responsible for the corresponding bias in pronoun assignment.
Importantly, as with any statistical bias, IC biases can be violated
without rendering the passage ungrammatical or incoherent, e.g., com-
pare (30a) with Jane hit Mary because she reacts violently to criticism.
Nonetheless, one might ask whether these biases affect reading times,
insofar as clauses in which the pronoun assignment is incongruent with
the preceding verb’s IC bias should take longer to read than ones in
23 This prediction ignores the difference between pronoun interpretation in syntac-
tically coordinate contexts (as in our experiments) versus syntactically subordinate
ones (as would be the case within an adjunct headed by because). As there is evidence
that this distinction may matter (Miltsakaki, 2001), it may ultimately need to be
accounted for in a richer probabilistic model of pronoun interpretation.
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which it is congruent. Caramazza et al. (1977) ran a reading time
experiment to test this prediction. Norming was done in a previous
study (Garvey et al., 1976, Experiment 1) using a sentence completion
task of the sort we employed in Experiment 2, in which participants
were asked to write completions for fragments such as (31):
(31) Tom scolded Bill because he
The percentage of interpretations to a referent was used as a measure of
the verb’s bias; with (31), for instance, they found that scold encodes
a strong bias towards its direct object (henceforth, an NP2 verb) as
opposed to one that encodes a bias towards its subject (henceforth, an
NP1 verb). This NP2 bias predicts that example (32a), in which the
preferred referent is congruent with the bias, should be read faster than
(32b), in which the preferred referent is incongruent with the bias.
(32) a. Tom scolded Bill because he was annoying.
b. Tom scolded Bill because he was annoyed.
Pairs of stimuli per (32a-b) were joined with two controls that used
gender unambiguous pronouns. The results confirmed the prediction;
sentences with bias-inconsistent pronoun interpretations took longer to
read than sentences with bias-consistent ones in both conditions.
There is an obvious relationship between these experiments and our
coherence analysis, in light of the fact that the connective because is an
explicit indicator of an Explanation relation. The results of Experiment
2 shown in Table IV also revealed a set of biases, in this case for transfer-
of-possession passages, in terms of both the likelihood of each possible
coherence relation to follow and of mentioning a particular referent
conditioned on each coherence relation. Interestingly, we found what
could be characterized as an overall NP1 IC bias here as well, with an
average of 80% of NP1 references in Explanation relations. Caramazza
et al. (1977) note as a major finding of their work that the ‘implicit
causality feature’ can be best represented as a continuum, i.e., when
the bias is represented as the proportion of continuations that suggest
NP1 as the referent, the values range continuously between 0 and 1.
This is exactly what the final term of Equation (29) captures, although
crucially these biases are conditioned on coherence relations.
As we alluded to in the previous section, the inclusion of because
in the stimulus prompts typically used in the implicit causality litera-
ture might do no more with respect to pronoun interpretation than to
restrict the operative coherence relation to Explanation. This analysis
predicts that the IC bias found in sentence completions using a because
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prompt as in (31) should align closely with the IC bias found for com-
pletions in a similar no-pronoun, full-stop condition when only those
passages that participate in an Explanation relation are considered.
To our knowledge, such an experiment has not been carried out to
date.24 We therefore ran a sentence completion experiment to test
this question. A positive outcome would suggest that IC effects are
a microcosm of a more general set of biases that apply in all contexts,
distinguishing themselves only with respect to the strength of their bias
toward a particular referent when an Explanation relation is operative.
6.1. Experiment 3
This experiment tested whether the biases found for IC verbs in pas-
sages containing a because prompt, mimicking the design of Garvey et
al. (1976, inter alia), are similar to those found for the Explanation
relationships identified in responses within a full-stop condition. Be-
cause we are mainly interested in the coherence-driven biases towards
referents generated by these different classes of verbs, a pronoun was
not included in the prompts. All subsequent first mentioned referents
were therefore cataloged, regardless of form of reference (i.e., pronoun
or proper name). This choice allowed the use of contexts that lacked
gender ambiguity, which facilitated the identification of the intended
referents of pronouns (cf. Stewart et al. 1998; Arnold 2001).
6.1.1. Stimuli
A 2x3 design was used that crossed verb type (IC verb vs. non-IC
verb) with continuation type (full stop vs. because vs. dialogue prompt).
The dialogue prompt condition was included for norming data for an
orthogonal future experiment and will not be further analyzed here.
Examples of the full stop and because condition are shown in (34):
(34) a. Tony disappointed Courtney.
24 Ehrlich (1980) ran an experiment in which the connective used was varied
between because, but, and and:
(33) a. Steve blamed Frank because he spilt the coffee.
b. Steve blamed Frank and he spilt the coffee.
c. Steve blamed Frank but he spilt the coffee.
Her results were mixed, which is not surprising on our analysis because neither but
nor and select for a single coherence relation: but is consistent with both Contrast
and Violated Expectation (which each have different biases), and and is consistent
with Occasion, Result, and Parallel (again, each having different biases). As such,
this manipulation does not reveal much about the predictions of a coherence-driven
theory.
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b. Tony disappointed Courtney because
40 IC verbs and 40 non-IC verbs were taken from McKoon et al. (1993),
with three replacements. (The verbs cheat, jeer, and dread were felt to
sound awkward in our sentence frames, and were replaced by offend,
mock, and fear respectively.) The IC category was further broken down
into 20 each of NP1 and NP2 verbs. All context sentences contained
mentions of two possible referents, one male and one female. 20 filler
sentences used non-IC verbs and were followed by various interclausal
connectives (monologue continuation) or a dialogue response that con-
tained the beginning of a question (dialogue continuation), for a total
of 100 stimulus items per participant.
6.1.2. Participants
75 monolingual English-speaking undergraduates at UC San Diego
participated in the study for extra credit in Linguistics courses.
6.1.3. Task
The task followed the design of Experiment 2. Participants were asked
to write the first natural completion that comes to mind, without
adding extra humor or creativity to the task.
6.1.4. Results
The results for NP1 verbs, NP2 verbs, and non-IC verbs are presented
in Tables V–VII respectively. Entries for coherence relations are not
included if they comprised less than 5% of the continuations in the full-
stop condition. This was sometimes the case for Violated Expectation
and Occasion, and was always the case for Parallel.
Table V summarizes the results for the IC-NP1 verbs. The NP1 bias
of 85% for Explanation relations in the full-stop condition is essen-
tially equivalent to the 84% bias in the because condition, as predicted.
(Prompt type is not a significant predictor of bias: F1(1,70) < 0.0221,
p < 0.8822; F2(1,19) = 0.032, p < 0.86.) The lower 60% overall bias
found in the full-stop condition simply represents a watering-down of
the IC bias due to the existence of passages with coherence relations
other than Explanation, to which the IC bias is not relevant.
Table VI summarizes the results for the IC-NP2 verbs. Again the
Explanation bias toward NP1 in the full-stop condition is essentially
equivalent to the one in the because condition, as predicted. (Prompt
type: F1(1,73) = 0.4424, p < 0.5081; F2(1,19) = 1.2235; p < 0.2825.)
Finally, Table VII summarizes the results for the non-IC verbs. We
see that even for non-IC verbs, the average bias toward NP1 is consis-
tent between the because condition and the Explanation relations in the
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Table V. Probabilities from Experiment 3 (IC-NP1 verbs)
full stop because prompt
Coherence Rel P(CR) P(Subj | CR) P(CR) P(Subj | CR)
Explanation 58% .84 100% .85
Result 22% .10 – –
Elaboration 10% .61 – –
Table VI. Probabilities from Experiment 3 (IC-NP2 verbs)
full stop because prompt
Coherence Rel P(CR) P(Subj | CR) P(CR) P(Subj | CR)
Explanation 62% .13 100% .10
Result 15% .03 – –
Elaboration 14% .46 – –
full-stop condition. (Prompt type: F1(1,61) < 1, p < 0.982; F2(1,36)
= 1.4598, p < 0.2348.) This provides further evidence that there is
nothing special about IC verbs coupled with the connective because;
because simply marks an Explanation relation, and the referent bias
gets adjusted accordingly for IC and non-IC verbs alike.
Table VII. Probabilities from Experiment 3 (Non-IC verbs)
full stop because prompt
Coherence Rel P(CR) P(Subj | CR) P(CR) P(Subj | CR)
Explanation 24% .57 100% .56
Elaboration 29% .58 – –
Result 22% .24 – –
Violated Exp 13% .40 – –
Occasion 9% .53 – –
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The hypothesis is therefore confirmed: The IC biases seen in the be-
cause condition are highly consistent with those found for Explanation
relations in the full-stop condition across all three verb types. As in
Experiment 2, the summary statistics across coherence relations hide
the considerably stronger biases that are often a play when coherence
relations are conditioned on.25
Tables V–VII also bring to light that there is not one but two note-
worthy biases that are associated with IC verbs. Besides the biases
toward particular referents that have been our focus thus far, IC verbs
are also shown to be significantly more likely to evoke Explanation
continuations (60% for NP1 and NP2 continuations combined) than
non-IC verbs (24%), regardless of which referent gets mentioned first.
This suggests that the lexical semantics of IC verbs create a stronger-
than-usual expectation for an explanation. This bias may have gone
unnoticed in the literature because previous studies typically have used
only because prompts or have otherwise not categorized the coherence
relations operative in their passage completions.
All of these results suggest that contexts trigger rich probabilistic
information that is brought to bear during interpretation. In this sense,
the IC biases that have been documented in the literature represent
just one of up to ten biases that are exhibited in the no-bias conditions
of Tables V–VII (i.e., a bias for each of 5 relations coming next and a
bias for a particular referent given each relation). In fact, another one of
these biases – toward a referent given a Result relation – was previously
identified and termed Implicit Consequentiality by Stewart et al. (1998).
(See also the discussion in Crinean and Garnham 2006.) Using response
completions to passages such as Because John annoyed Bill, he, they
identify verbs that have both NP1 and NP2 consequentiality biases,
and demonstrate that these biases impact reading times. A prediction
of our analysis would therefore extend the on-line findings found for
both implicit causality and implicit consequentiality to the biases found
25 These results are surprising for the analysis of Stevenson et al. (2000), who
argue for a semantic focusing account over a (Hobbsian, coherence-based) relational
account. Whereas we argue that connectives influence coherence establishment and
coherence establishment in turn influences pronoun interpretation, in their analysis
connectives constrain pronoun interpretation more directly by modifying the salience
of entities, in a second role that they consider distinct from their role in constraining
coherence establishment. The assumptions that they place on coherence-driven anal-
yses are problematic, however, and do not adequately represent either our analysis
or Hobbs’s original proposal. Whereas we will not go into further detail on these
matters, we do note that the alignment of biases between the full-stop condition for
Explanation and the because condition can only be viewed as a coincidence in their
theory.
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for a broader range of contexts, across all coherence relations per the
probabilities assigned by Equation (29).
6.2. Immediate Focusing vs. Clausal Integration
A more recent controversy has centered around when IC information
is used, that is, whether the information is utilized early enough so as
to essentially constitute a focusing mechanism (the immediate focusing
account, e.g., McKoon et al. 1993), or instead is used only as part
of a sentence-final clause integration process (the clausal integration
account, e.g., Stewart et al. (2000)). The clausal integration account
predicts that IC effects will arise later during sentence interpretation
than the immediate focusing account does, at least when a pronoun
occurs early in the clause. Our analysis predicts aspects of both of
these models: The biases we have documented should be available at
the time the pronoun is encountered and hence should influence reading
times at or soon after the pronoun, but so will subsequent words that
affect the likely coherence relation, and as a result, the likely referent
for a pronoun given that coherence relation.
These predictions are supported by the recent study of Koornneef
and van Berkum (2006, KvB). Characterizing IC biases as “proba-
bilistic asymmetries” that “reflect something more subtle about the
way we use various sources of information in everyday language com-
prehension”, KvB looked for mid-sentence reading delays caused by
pronouns that are inconsistent with the bias of a preceding IC verb
in two experiments with gender-unambiguous pronouns. In a word-by-
word self-paced reading task, they found that words in the pre-critical
region were read equally fast across the bias-consistency conditions,
but readers slowed down right at a bias-inconsistent pronoun, with a
significant main effect emerging at the first two words thereafter. In an
eye tracking study that measured mean regression path durations, again
no differences were measured in the pre-critical region, but pronouns
that were inconsistent with the IC bias reliably perturbed the reading
process at or shortly after the pronoun. The results of both experiments
therefore suggest that IC information becomes available rapidly enough
to appear mid-sentence, even in passages in which the gender of the
pronoun singles out a unique referent.
While these results support the immediate focusing account over the
clausal integration account, KvB do not discount the latter entirely:
However, our findings are not necessarily inconsistent with an incre-
mental clausal integration account, in which the information made
available by the subordinate clause is ‘retroactively’ related to the
interpretation of the main clause on a word-by-word basis. (p. 459)
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This view, which they similarly cast in terms of probabilistically-driven
expectations, is precisely the type of account that we advocate; it is
evident from Koornneef and van Berkum’s discussion that there is a
close relationship between our respective views of expectation-driven
discourse interpretation and how it influences pronoun interpretation.
We therefore consider Koornneef and van Berkum’s on-line results as
initial evidence for our approach, and would predict similar results from
violating other coherence-driven biases as well. On-line investigations
of these additional hypotheses must await further research.
To summarize this section, our results suggest that IC biases are
simply microcosms of a more general system of coherence-driven biases
that drive pronoun interpretation in all context types. These results
also show that IC verbs are exceptional with respect to two biases they
engender: In addition to previously-known biases toward a particular
referent in an Explanation context, they also generate stronger-than-
usual expectations for an upcoming Explanation relation.
7. The Grammatical Subject Preference
Finally, we evaluate the evidence for a grammatical subject preference
in light of our analysis and results. Crawley et al. (1990) report on two
studies which they argue support the idea that hearers use a subject
assignment strategy, contrasting it specifically with the predictions of
a parallel function strategy. They characterize such strategies as “rel-
atively mechanical rules of thumb which tell us to whom or what to
assign a pronoun”, which are nonetheless only invoked when “there are
no other strong constraints (such as linguistic or pragmatic constraints)
on assignment”. In a self-paced reading task, participants read a three-
sentence passage that ended with a clause that contained a pronoun in
object position. (We restrict discussion to their ambiguous pronoun
condition.) Although they acknowledge the difficulty in completely
eliminating the influence of general knowledge in their stimuli, three
judges checked each stimulus to ensure that either assignment of the
pronoun resulted in a plausible interpretation. Participants answered
a question that revealed their pronoun assignments. A bias was found
toward the grammatical subject over the object, with an average of
23.7 subject interpretations for the 40 passages (a 59.25% bias). It also
took slightly longer to read sentences with object referents. The results
of a direct assignment task using the same stimuli were very similar,
with an average of 24 subject assignments (60% subject bias).
Despite their conclusions, however, nothing in their experiment rules
out the possibility that their results arose from discourse-driven expec-
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tations generated by their stimuli rather than from a distinct pronoun-
specific interpretation strategy. Furthermore, as Smyth (1994) points
out, properties of their reading time data suggests that some stimuli
may have been consistently interpreted with subject assignment and
others consistently with object assignment. As such, perhaps a different
set of stimuli would have yielded a different result.
To shed light on this issue, we analyzed the biases found for the non-
IC verbs in the full-stop condition in our Experiment 3. A representative
sample of 10 of the 40 verb frames used in that experiment, all of which
were from McKoon et al.’s (1993) stimuli, are shown in Table VIII.26
As can be seen, the NP1 biases show an even representation across
Table VIII. Biases for 10 selected













the spectrum from 0 to 1. (The entire set of 40 verbs showed the
same even distribution as well, with exactly half of the verbs having
a bias above 0.5 and half falling at 0.5 or below.) Granted there are
several differences between these biases and those found by Crawley
et al.: These were collected from a sentence completion study without
26 Although 25 participants saw each of these in the full-stop condition, the actual
number of qualifying entries was generally less, since some did not mention either
referent, or mentioned both at once with the pronoun they. All but one of the entries
included in the table had at least 20 qualifying continuations (saw had 18).
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a pronoun prompt, and represent first-mentioned referents rather than
only subjects. Nonetheless, these results highlight the degree of freedom
afforded in the selection of stimuli. Selecting verb frames from the top
half of the table would presumably tilt the results toward a subject
assignment strategy, whereas verb frames from the bottom half would
presumably tilt the evidence away from it.
Whereas researchers who posit the existence of pronoun interpre-
tation preferences and heuristics have consistently exempted ‘prag-
matically biased’ examples, viewing stimuli in terms of the statistical
distributions they engender makes it clear that there really is no such
thing as a passage that is devoid of pragmatic bias. The numbers may be
stronger or weaker, but any context will give rise to a set of biases over
continuation types with respect to coherence and a set of biases for like-
lihood of mention given a continuation type. It is therefore incumbent
on researchers to explain exactly what counts as a plausibility factor
when using it to exempt examples that fail to conform. In the case of
the subject assignment strategy, such conditions would not only have
to include the intuitively high-bias NP2 verbs in the IC literature, but
also the seemingly mundane perfective transfer-of-possession passages
from Experiment 2 and the bottom five verb frames in Table VIII, all
of which do not follow the predictions of the strategy.
This argument should not be misconstrued to suggest that a bias
towards subjects would not emerge if one could compute statistical
expectations over all possible contexts. For instance, one might expect
that many verb frames are frequently continued with Occasion rela-
tions, and that many Occasions will display continuity in the agent
role – and as a result, oftentimes continuity in the subject position
as well – a combination that would tilt the statistical biases towards
the subject position. The point is that this bias then emerges from
general mechanisms without any need to posit a separate heuristic.
Indeed, a coherence-driven theory is in principle capable of explaining
such overall biases while still capturing the differing behavior of certain
other verb frames, using the same types of predictive interpretation
mechanisms that we find evidence for in sentence processing.
A final observation is in order, however, as experiments by Stevenson
et al. (1994) provide a type of evidence for a subject bias that we
have yet to address. Recall that in addition to their pronoun-prompt
condition, Stevenson et al. had a no-pronoun, full-stop condition (as we
used in our Experiment 3), in which participants chose their own forms
of referring expressions. Across their stimulus types, they found that
this choice was heavily biased towards a pronoun when the referent was
the previous subject, and likewise towards a name when the referent
was a non-subject. (Arnold (2001) found similarly strong biases.) At
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first blush this result seems paradoxical: If participants have a clear
production preference to refer to non-subjects with full names, why
do they so readily assign a pronoun to a non-subject in the pronoun-
prompt condition (e.g., 49.0% to the Goal in Source-Goal contexts)?
Stevenson et al. suggest that, in addition to a general thematic role
preferences, “heuristic search processes triggered by the presence of a
pronoun” provide an additional bias to the first-mentioned entity, that
is, that there is an overlaid subject assignment strategy. This suggestion
would explain, for instance, why they found far more references to
the Goal in their Goal-Source pronoun-prompt condition (84.6% by
our calculation), in which the Goal is also the subject, than in the
Source-Goal condition (again, 49.0%).
However, there are other possible explanations for these results that
do not require appeal to any specific interpretation heuristics. As an
illustration, we consider the relationship between pronoun production
and interpretation that emerges when cast in Bayesian terms:
P (referent|pronoun) = P (pronoun|referent)P (referent)
P (pronoun)
Whereas up to this point we have considered pronoun interpretation
biases (P (referent|pronoun)) as conditioned by coherence-driven ex-
pectations, this formulation splits the bias into two: an expectation
towards a subsequent mention of a referent (P (referent)), and an ex-
pectation about the form of referring expression that the speaker would
use to mention that referent (P (pronoun|referent)).27 Under this for-
mulation, there is nothing inconsistent about an interpretation bias
toward a non-subject referent despite a strong bias against pronom-
inalizing non-subjects, assuming a suitably large subsequent mention
bias toward the non-subject.28 Our results and those of Stevenson et al.
and Arnold are therefore all consistent with a scenario in which gram-
matical or information-structural factors (subjecthood, topichood) play
a greater role in conditioning P (pronoun|referent), and coherence-
driven expectations play a greater role in conditioning P (referent).
If this is the case, we would expect to find a pronominal bias toward
the subject position beyond what is predicted from coherence-driven
expectations alone (exempting Parallel relations, per the arguments in
27 We will ignore the term P (pronoun), which is a constant factor over all possible
referents in the context.
28 Such a situation occurred in Arnold’s Source-Goal condition. She found that
76.0% of the references to the subject were pronominalized, whereas only 20.1%
of references to the object-of-PP were. However, the next mention bias toward the
Goal was an overwhelming 85.6%.
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Section 3), although importantly, without the need to posit that hearers
utilize pronoun-specific interpretation strategies or heuristics.29
To conclude this section, our analysis of seemingly unremarkable
verb frames as exemplified in Table VIII reveals great variance in their
prior contextual biases towards particular referents. It would there-
fore seem essential that such biases be controlled for before the exis-
tence of an overlaid subject assignment preference can be established.
Further, while we suspect that there are sources of pronoun-specific
subject biases in pronoun interpretation, they do not necessary entail
the existence of special-purpose, heuristic interpretation ‘strategies’,
but instead may ultimately prove to be better captured within a more
parsimonious, expectation-driven account.
8. Conclusion
We have presented new experimental evidence in support of a coherence-
driven analysis of pronoun interpretation, and described how it can
accommodate previous findings suggestive of conflicting preferences
and biases. The results of our first experiment demonstrated that the
grammatical subject and grammatical parallelism preferences can be
neutralized when coherence is carefully controlled for. We furthermore
provided a linguistic analysis that establishes that the grammatical role
parallelism preference is an epiphenomenon of an independent interac-
tion between information structure and accent placement in Parallel
coherence relations that applies to referring expressions of all types.
The results of the second experiment distinguished the thematic
role and event structure biases proposed by Stevenson et al. (1994),
supporting the event-structure bias. The experiment further showed
that the bias is limited primarily to those coherence relations which
implicate event structure in their formulation, and that the approxi-
mately 50-50 distribution of references found in Source-Goal passage
completions represents but an average of a set of considerably stronger
biases evident when coherence relations are conditioned on.
Whereas evidence for incremental interpretation has historically been
seen as problematic for coherence-based analyses, we have described
a model that captures how a hearer’s coherence-driven expectations
about how the discourse is likely to proceed could predict on-line mea-
29 Having made this point, we want to stress that it is not our goal to argue
for this Bayesian analysis, as it raises a large number of questions that we are not
prepared to address. We only wish to offer it as a proof-of-concept of how a subject
bias in interpretation could emerge beyond what is predicted by coherence-driven
expectations alone. A fuller exploration of the model is the subject of ongoing work.
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surements of pronoun interpretation difficulty. The results of Experi-
ment 3 confirmed a prediction of this analysis, specifically that implicit
causality biases evident in passage completions with because prompts
are essentially equivalent to those in a full-stop condition when only
Explanation relations are analyzed. The results of this experiment also
demonstrate that IC biases represent but one instance of a more com-
prehensive set of biases that drive predictive discourse interpretation,
which include biases for what type of continuation will ensue in ad-
dition to biases toward mentioning particular referents conditioned
on continuation type. Although on-line tests of the predictions of the
analysis await future work, biases estimated from passage completion
experiments have been repeatedly shown in the literature to influence
pronoun processing difficulty.
Finally, we described how coherence-driven expectations about who
will be mentioned next have the potential to dramatically affect evi-
dence for a grammatical subject preference. We also speculated that
there are subject biases in pronoun interpretation that go beyond what
can be predicted by coherence-driven expectations alone, and how these
might be explainable without recourse to any heuristic interpretation
‘strategies’. A suitably comprehensive evaluation of the tenability of
this approach must await future work, however.
In sum, the coherence analysis is capable of explaining a wide variety
of often contradictory results in the previous literature in a theoretically
parsimonious manner. It offers an explanation of what the underlying
sources of previously-proposed biases are, and predicts in what contexts
evidence for each will surface. The theory finds no need to include
caveats for examples with ‘pragmatic bias’, since the theory directly
captures the fact that all passages contain pragmatic bias. A ramifi-
cation for future psycholinguistics work is the need to control for the
pronoun-independent, coherence-driven expectations that are embod-
ied in experimental stimuli, as our results argue that this is required
before evidence for overlaid biases or preferences can be successfully
established.
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